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Abstract 
Up to 25 percent of all anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are caused by deforestation, 
and Indonesia is the third largest greenhouse gas emitter worldwide due to land use change 
and deforestation. On the island of Sulawesi in the vicinity of the Lore Lindu National Park 
(LLNP), many smallholders contribute to conversion processes at the forest margin as a result 
of their agricultural practices. Specifically the area dedicated to cocoa plantations has 
increased from zero (1979) to nearly 18,000 hectares (2001). Some of these plots have been 
established inside the 220,000 hectares of the LLNP. An intensification process is observed 
with a consequent reduction of the shade tree density. 
This study assesses which impact carbon sequestration payments for forest management 
systems have on the prevailing land use systems. Additionally, the level of incentives is 
determined which motivates farmers to desist from further deforestation and land use 
intensification activities. Household behaviour and resource allocation is analysed with a 
comparative static linear programming model. As these models prove to be a reliable tool for 
policy analysis, the output can indicate the adjustments in resource allocation and land use 
shifts when introducing compensation payments.  
The data was collected in a household survey in six villages around the LLNP. Four 
household categories are identified according to their dominant agroforestry systems. These 
range from low intensity management with a high degree of shading to highly intensified 
shade free systems.  
At the plot level, the payments from carbon sequestration are the highest for the full shade 
cocoa agroforestry system, but with low carbon prices of € 5 tCO2e-1 these constitute 5 
percent of the cocoa gross margin. Focusing on the household level, however, an increase of 
up to 18 percent of the total gross margin can be realised. Furthermore, for differentiated 
carbon prices up to € 32 tCO2e-1 the majority of the households have an incentive to adopt the 
more sustainable shade intensive agroforestry system. A win-win situation seems to appear, 
whereby, when targeting only the shade intensive agroforestry systems with carbon payments, 
the poorest households economically benefit the most and land use systems with high 
environmental benefits are promoted. 
 
Keywords: Payments for environmental services; carbon sequestration; agroforestry systems; 
cocoa, linear programming; economic incentives; poverty 
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Payments for Environmental Services - 
Incentives through Carbon Sequestration Compensation for Cocoa-based 
Agroforestry Systems in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia 
Christina Seeberg-Elverfeldt, Stefan Schwarze & Manfred Zeller  
 
1. Introduction 
The net global change in forest area has been slowing down from –8.9 million hectares per 
year in the 1990s to –7.3 million hectares during the last years due to plantations and 
restoration of degraded land, especially in Europe, North America and East Asia. However, 
primary forests are still lost or modified at a rate of six million hectares per year because of 
selective logging or deforestation, and there is no indication that the rate is slowing (FAO 
2006). Deforestation in turn plays an important role in the global warming process, as it 
accounts for up to 25 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions (IPCC 2007). Thus, global 
carbon stocks in forest biomass are decreasing by 1.1 Gt of carbon annually (Marland, Boden, 
and Andres 2006). Indonesia has the second highest annual net loss in forest area worldwide. 
During the last five years two percent of its remaining forest area was lost every year (FAO 
2006). Additionally, it is among the top three greenhouse gas emitters primarily because of 
deforestation, peatland degradation and forest fires.  
Deforestation is a difficult issue to tackle on a national scale, as its drivers are complex. Five 
broad categories can be determined as its underlying driving forces. These are demographic, 
economic, technological, policy and institutional, and cultural factors. In general, at the 
proximate level infrastructure extension, agricultural expansion, as well as wood extraction 
are the main driving forces for tropical deforestation and land use change. (Geist and Lambin 
2002). The majority of deforestation incidences is connected to agricultural expansion. The 
incentive for forest conversion for many smallholders can be attributed to the fact that other 
land uses such as permanent cropping, cattle ranching, shifting cultivation, and colonization 
agriculture yield higher revenues than forestry. Through their traditional land use practices, 
smallholders often contribute to deforestation processes. Hence, local emissions of carbon are 
affected and carbon stocks and associated fluxes are often negatively influenced. In the 
framework of the Kyoto Protocol, forestry activities, or so-called carbon sink projects1 are 
recognized as an important means of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions, since carbon 
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dioxide is removed through photosynthesis. Thus, forestry projects which result in additional 
greenhouse gases being actively sequestered from the atmosphere and stored in sinks, can 
generate carbon credits or certified emission reductions (CER)2. In order to create a 
homogenous tradable commodity, emission reductions of any greenhouse gas are traded in 
form of tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2e) which means that the climate change 
potential of each greenhouse gas is expressed as an equivalent of the climate change potential 
of CO2 (UNFCCC 1997). Under the current rules established for the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM)3, only afforestation and reforestation activities are considered eligible. 
However, in the on-going climate discussions, as during the UNFCCC Climate Conference in 
Bali in 2007, other sink activities, such as reducing emissions from deforestation or 
“compensated reduction” are high on the political agenda. This discussion was first initiated 
by the Rainforest Coalition, a group of developing nations with rainforest who formally 
offered voluntary carbon emission reductions by conserving forests in exchange for access to 
international markets for emissions trading. It is especially the forest-rich countries, such as 
Brazil and Indonesia, who are pushing for the financial acknowledgement of forest 
conservation.  
On the island of Sulawesi in Indonesia, the forest margin of the Lore Lindu National Park 
(LLNP), which covers 220,000 hectares, has been facing encroachment and consequently 
deforestation. The main activities to be observed are an expansion of the area dedicated to 
agricultural activities by 20 percent during the last two decades, the tripling of the perennial 
crop plantations area and expansion into former forest areas, as well as selective and clear-cut 
logging. A village survey in 2001 revealed that 70 percent of the villages bordering the LLNP 
have agricultural land inside the Park (Maertens 2003). A satellite image analysis detected a 
mean annual deforestation rate of 0.3 percent in the research region between 1983 and 2002 
(Erasmi and Priess 2007). However, cocoa plantations under shade trees cannot be detected 
by optical satellite instruments, thus, the encroachment process at the forest margin is not 
fully reflected by this figure. In the vicinity of the LLNP, a great spatial heterogeneity of 
1 The term carbon sinks is applied to pools or reservoirs, such as forests, oceans and soils, which absorb carbon, 
and for which carbon storage exceeds carbon release. The process of capturing carbon from the atmosphere and 
storing it in vegetation biomass is referred to as sequestration. 
2 The terms carbon credits, certificates and CER are used interchangeably. One credit is the equivalent of one 
tonne of CO2 emissions. 
3 For fulfilling the reduction obligations, the Kyoto Protocol offers three flexible mechanisms, namely Emissions 
Trading, Joint Implementation and the CDM. The CDM provides for Annex I Parties (most OECD countries and 
countries in transition) to implement projects that reduce emissions in non-Annex I countries in return for CER, 
and assist the host Parties in achieving sustainable development and contributing to the ultimate objective of the 
convention. The generated CERs can be used by Annex I countries to help meet their emission targets (FAO 
2004). 
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agricultural production is apparent. In general, human activities are much more concentrated 
in the northern and western part of the Park than in the south. For example in Palolo, one of 
the four main valleys embracing the LLNP in the north-east, the closed forest decreased by 35 
percent between 2001 and 2004 due to logging, whereas the area covered by cocoa plantations 
increased by 11 percent (Rohwer 2006). In addition, an intensification process among the 
cocoa agroforestry systems (AFS), whereby farmers gradually reduce the shade tree cover, 
can be observed. The focus of the present research is therefore twofold. We assess the impact 
of payments for carbon sequestration activities on the land use systems of smallholders in the 
regions bordering the LLNP in Indonesia, and whether such payments can provide an 
incentive for the adoption of more sustainable and shade tree covered land use practices and 
contribute to the conservation of the rainforest margin. Additionally, we investigate whether 
these payments can provide a solution for the poor households to overcome their income 
constraints. 
2. Framework 
The research is motivated by the need to understand which level of incentives is required for a  
stimulation of the farmers to desist from further deforestation and land use intensification 
activities. Internationally the awareness for the requirement to develop and support payment 
mechanisms and incentives for the provision and preservation of environmental services such 
as biodiversity conservation, preservation of landscape beauty, watershed management and 
carbon sequestration is growing. Initiatives and projects are promoted where local actors are 
given payments in return for switching to more sustainable land-use practices and ecosystem 
protection. They usually imply the payments to be made by the beneficiaries of the 
environmental services. These “payments for environmental services” (PES) policies have 
been defined by Wunder (2007), as voluntary, conditional agreements between at least one 
“seller” and one “buyer” over a well-defined environmental service – or a land use presumed 
to produce that service. In reality, so far very few of the existing PES schemes fully satisfy all 
conditions, but should be referred to as “PES-like schemes” (Wunder 2007). Basically, they 
are based on the principle of externalities. Carbon sequestration is a typical positive 
externality, as it is an unplanned side effect of sustainable forest management and 
conservation in a specific area, and the benefits are not confined locally, but accrue to all of 
humanity. Already Meade (1952) recommended to generalise the Pigouvian welfare theory to 
find a market solution for a positive externality situation, so that private production by using a 
subsidy results in additional social benefits. Thus, it is argued that the discrepancy between 
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the private marginal costs for the provision of sustainable forest management systems and the 
social marginal cost of such measures can be reduced by offering incentive payments for 
external benefits of management measures.  
PES, being market-based mechanisms, can render forestry to be a competitive land use and 
farmers and loggers might decide to change their land use practices to retain or replant trees if 
they receive sufficient remuneration. In the case of deforestation avoidance, farmers can 
receive a compensation payment as an incentive not to cut down the forest and use the timber 
or put the land to agricultural use. This is in line with the “compensated reduction” proposal, 
according to which countries electing to reduce their national emissions from deforestation 
would be authorized to issue carbon certificates, similar to the CERs of the CDM, which 
could be sold to governments or private investors to fulfil their emission targets (Santilli et al. 
2005).  
In the region around the LLNP four cocoa agroforestry systems can be distinguished 
according to the degree of shading and shade tree species, as well as the management 
intensity: AFS I exhibits a high degree of shading with natural forest trees and a low 
management intensity, while at the other end of the spectrum AFS IV involves intensive 
management and fully sun grown cocoa. The gross margins of cocoa consistently increase 
along the cocoa AFS gradient from I towards IV. There seems to be a trade-off situation 
between an intensification of the cocoa cultivation with shade free plantations and higher 
economic returns and shade-grown, low intensity management cocoa with lower returns and 
biodiversity conservation. Even though the cocoa grown in full sun has higher mean yields 
and obtains substantially higher gross margin values in comparison with shade grown cocoa, 
in the long run the intensification is likely to be unsustainable. Anticipated consequences are 
agronomic risks, such as declining soil nutrient levels, as well as socio-economic dangers like 
the dependency on single crops and a negative impact on local food security (Belsky and 
Siebert 2003). Additionally, the AFS I provides high biodiversity values and habitat for the 
native fauna, whereas the establishment of shade free cocoa plantations reduces the landscape 
level diversity by eliminating secondary forests on fallow land and may adversely affect the 
soil fertility (Siebert 2002). Another study assessed the species-richness of plants and animals 
and ecosystem functioning (Steffan-Dewenter et al. 2007). This study did not discover a 
linear gradient of biodiversity loss in the four agroforestry systems, but deduced that only 
small quantitative changes in biodiversity and ecosystem functioning occurred when changing 
from AFS II to III. However, they also conclude that in the long run the intensification and 
reduction of shade trees is an unsustainable path. Unfortunately, this process already takes 
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place in the region. A willingness to pay study, which suggests a higher preference for low 
shade agroforestry systems among the local farmers, supports these results (Glenk et al. 
2006). Thus, to prevent an intensification of the agroforestry systems to monocultures in the 
region, economic incentives are required. These could be price premiums, as they are already 
available for a long time for fair trade and organic coffee. Recently premiums have been 
introduced for fair trade and organic cocoa. The fair trade premium for standard quality cocoa 
is € 100 per tonne. The minimum price for fair trade standard quality cocoa, including the 
premium, is € 1,250 per tonne. Also for organic cocoa producers receive a higher price than 
for conventional cocoa, ranging between € 75 to 225 per tonne (ICCO 2007). Alternatives 
could also be price premiums offered through carbon certificates to offer an incentive for the 
more shade grown, biodiversity rich and sustainable cocoa agroforestry systems and slow 
down the intensification process.  
Another important phenomena in the region is that many of the Bugis households who were 
resettled by the government in the 1990s from South Sulawesi and Poso into the research area 
started to buy land from the local Kaili and Kulawi households. In many cases the local ethnic 
households had originally obtained this land by clearing primary forest on the border of the 
National Park (Sitorius 2002; Faust et al. 2003). They consider themselves to be the owner’s 
of the village territory and do not see the necessity to buy land, but in turn realise the 
opportunity to generate additional income by selling parts of their land. This money is usually 
used for buying status symbols or for ceremonial purposes, which require substantial amounts 
of cash (Weber et al. 2007). In due course they are often in need for further land for their own 
cropping activities, since the majority of them are subsistence farmers, leading to additional 
encroachment at the forest margin of the National Park. In general, a social stratification can 
be detected between the economically better-off Bugis’ households and the autochthonous 
households, who are predominantly poorer (Schippers et al. 2007). 
Incentive-based schemes have become very common during the last decade, and hundreds of 
new and very elaborate PES initiatives have been implemented. For example, in Costa Rica 
the National Fund for Forest Financing (FONAFIFO) operates a scheme which bundles 
funding from various sources, including international donors, carbon buyers, the Costa Rican 
public through a national fuel tax, and local industries interested in water quality and flows. 
Consequently, land users can receive payments for specified land uses, such as new 
plantations, sustainable logging, and conservation of natural forests. In Mexico, a payment for 
a hydrological environmental services programme is carried out. Other PES examples are 
found in Colombia, Ecuador and El Salvador (Pagiola, Arcenas, and Platais 2005). In Asia 
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one of the most prominent programmes is RUPES (Rewarding the Upland Poor for 
Ecosystem Services), which is coordinated by the World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF). In 
one of these projects in Indonesia farmers are assisted by RUPES to obtain conditional land 
tenure in exchange for adopting mixed agro-forestry systems that increase erosion control and 
biodiversity (Jack, Kousky, and Sims 2007).  
A great variety of studies have been conducted employing different methods and considering 
the supply and/or the demand side aspects to determine the value of environmental services as 
done by Pattanayak (2004), Olschweski and Benítez (2005) and Antle et al. (2007). The trick, 
however, remains to find the specific price at which the marginal cost of the payment equals 
the marginal benefit of the behaviour that it stimulates. The prices for carbon certificates 
fluctuate widely, depending on the type of certificate, whether it is an emission reduction 
generated through a project-based activity, such as CER, or allowance based transactions, 
allocated under existing (or up-coming) cap-and-trade regimes, such as the EU allowances. 
Additionally, the voluntary greenhouse gas emission offset markets are evolving rapidly, 
especially in the United States. Looking at permanent CER, a wide variation of prices can be 
observed. In 2006 certificates were traded in a range between US$ 6.30 up to US$ 27.01 per 
tCO2e, with an average of US$ 10.90 (Capoor and Ambrosi 2007). In the CDM counter issued 
by the GTZ in December 2007, the CER prices per tCO2e observed were between € 5 and 
€ 18. 
Accordingly, we investigate whether current carbon credit prices are sufficient to induce 
farmers to adopt more sustainable land use practices and thus, also promote stable agricultural 
activities and hence the stability of the margin of the forest. The purpose of this paper is to 
provide an insight into whether environmental service payment schemes could have an impact 
on land use changes. Specifically, we determine which level of incentives would be necessary 
to encourage a shift towards land use practices, which in the long run provide higher 
environmental benefits and an elevated ecosystem functioning and thus, contribute to the 
conservation of the rainforest margin.    
3. Data and Methods 
3.1. Linear programming model 
We chose a comparative static linear programming model to analyse the behaviour of the 
households and their resource allocation. These models simulate the farmers’ reaction to 
interventions and the effect of technology changes on economic decisions about natural 
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resource use management (Barbier and Bergeron 1999). Linear programming has proven to 
be a reliable method for studying the impact of policy activities, such as in this case carbon 
payments (Vosti, Witcover, and Carpentier 2002). As with all methods, there are some 
limitations, such as the assumption of certain values and preferences when specifying the 
objective function, the possibility of non-linearity and feedback between variables, as well as 
the dynamics of systems. One has to be aware of these problems, but for the purpose of this 
research linear programming has been considered an appropriate method. Especially, since it 
is a useful technique to assess technology changes or adoption potentials ex ante, so that 
careful planning for new policies or strategies can be undertaken. As an input for the model, 
the gross margins for the main cropping activities paddy rice, upland rice, maize and cocoa 
were calculated. Additionally, forest conversion activities based on various economic-
political-environmental parameters from the research region were included to portray the 
behaviour of the smallholders as realistically as possible. Given the objective function, the 
solution procedure maximises the total gross margin (TGM) of the farm by finding the 
optimal set of activities for the household type, under the respective restrictions such as farm 
size, suitability of the land for various crops, food security, the credit limit, family work force, 
and the seasonal peak requirement of labour for each activity. The credit limit is the 
maximum amount of credit that a household expects to be able to borrow from formal and 
informal sources (Diagne and Zeller 2001). The farm conditions are stable, thus risk and time 
dimensions are not included in the model. Risk is not accounted for, as the farmer has 
information about alternative production activities, and input and output prices. In the 
research region most of the agroforestry plots contain trees of mixed age, therefore there is no 
clearly defined investment period and time of returns. Hence, the time lag between investment 
and returns has been ignored, as there are always some trees which can already be harvested 
whilst the others still mature. Furthermore, initial investment costs are very low and the 
additional labour in the first three unproductive years of the cocoa tree cannot be clearly 
separated from other activities necessary for the already productive trees on the cocoa plots. 
In another study in the same region which focused on smallholder cocoa farmers’ technology 
adoption, application and optimisation, the same conditions apply and similar assumptions 
were used for the linear programming model (Taher 1996).  
3.2. Farm household types 
The data on the existing agricultural production systems for the model was collected in a 
household survey in six villages in the surroundings of the LLNP in 2006. We categorised the 
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households according to the dominant agroforestry system among their cocoa plots, and 
determined four corresponding household types (HHI - HHIV). A random sample of 46 
households was drawn from the total sample of 325 households in 13 villages from the 
research project. These were randomly selected based on a stratified sampling method (Zeller, 
Schwarze, and Rheenen 2002) for a household survey in 2001 and 2004. The survey at hand 
focused on general aspects of the household and farm characteristics, land resources and their 
use, agricultural production activities, forest use, as well as the households’ perception of the 
LLNP, the forest, and its functions. The four household types have different resource 
endowments, such as land and labour availability and their credit limit. The major 
characteristics are presented in Table 1 in order to indicate the differences between them. 
Table 1. Characteristics of household classes I – IV  
 Household class 
 I II III IV 
Total cultivated land (ha) 2.5 2.8 2.8 2.5 
Cocoa AFS I (ha) 1.49 0.24 0 0 
Cocoa AFS II (ha) 0.77 1.31 1.09 0.33 
Cocoa AFS III (ha) 0.25 1.16 1.73 0 
Cocoa AFS IV (ha) 0.02 0 0 1.72 
Family labour days per month     32.4 29.5 34.4 31.6 
Credit limit (€/year) 33 720 1,015 570 
Ethnicity (% non-local HHs) 0 19 22 80 
 
Thus, one can see that the household type I has the lowest credit limit and the least cultivated 
land. The main share of the land is dedicated to the cocoa AFS I. Mainly the local Kaili, 
Kulawi and Napu households own this plot type. Household types II and III have an 
increasing credit limit and most land available for cultivation, and they dedicate most of their 
land to AFS II and AFS II, respectively. In these household classes the share of migrants, 
such as Bugis, Toraja and Poso families, becomes more dominant. Household type IV, who is 
mainly non-local, predominantly grows the intensively managed AFS IV. However, its credit 
limit is only the second highest and its land availability is the same as that of household type 
I. This could be an indication that with limited credit and land availability they adopt a more 
intensive production system in comparison to the other household types. With the help of a 
poverty assessment tool based on principle component analysis (Zeller et al. 2006) the 
households in the region were classified into poverty groups according to their relative 
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welfare. The N (0.1)-normally distributed poverty index allows to group the households into 
terciles and makes it possible to draw comparisons between the poorest, poor and better off 
households. 67 percent of the type I households belong to the poorest households, whereas 63 
percent of the type IV households can be categorised as better off. The households of the two 
other categories fall into all three welfare groups. We note, that there is a poverty gradient to 
be found from HHI towards HHIV. This corroborates the findings of Schippers et al . (2007) of 
the economic marginalisation of the local households, who are much poorer in comparison to 
the migrant Bugis. These tend to be found in the highest income groups, again a result 
mirrored by findings of Weber at al. (2007) and own the more intensively managed cocoa 
agroforestry systems. 
3.3. Carbon accounting methodology 
For carbon accounting the amount of carbon sequestration which is to be claimed as a “carbon 
credit” is limited to the net amount of change in the total forest carbon pool from one period 
to the next. In order to obtain the site specific total above- and below ground biomass for 
cocoa trees, a logarithmic growth regression model was adopted (highest R2 value of 0.76). 
The biomass can then be converted to carbon using a conversion factor of 0.5 g of carbon 
respectively for 1 g of biomass (Brown 1997).  To obtain the tradable commodity CO2e, the 
conversion factor for carbon of 3.667 is used. The results show that for this specific region a 
cocoa tree, on average, stores 8.05 kg carbon over a time span of 25 years, with the more 
intensively managed and densely planted AFS IV accumulating more carbon (46 kg/ha) than 
the less intensively managed systems I-III (39 kg/ha). Additionally, 0.5 t ha-1 yr-1 of soil 
organic carbon was added, a figure from the literature (Hamburg 2000), as no site-specific 
data exists. Due to lack of data, the calculation for carbon accumulation in soils is assumed to 
occur linearly in time.4 All carbon measurements for above-, below-ground and soil carbon 
were added up to obtain an estimate of the total carbon per hectare of the cocoa trees. Finally, 
this amount was converted to CO2e, which is the basis to calculate the amount of certificates 
to be obtained for the different agroforestry systems. 
According to the Kyoto protocol, all credits from sink projects have a temporary status and 
expire after a certain time. Only trees which are planted at the beginning of the crediting 
period can be assigned temporary certificates of emission reductions (tCER). A tCER is 
defined as a CER issued for an afforestation project activity under the CDM, which expires at 
 
4 For comparison, the total carbon pool has also been calculated excluding soil carbon. As the difference is quite 
small (3 percent decrease in annuity payment), it is assumed that it is acceptable to include soil carbon. 
 the end of the commitment period following the one in which it is issued (UNFCCC 2003). 
The tCER are limited to five years, after which they can be re-issued. Once the tCER are not 
re-certified, a permanent solution is needed to fulfil the reduction requirements. To make 
things straightforward for this calculation, we assumed that the credits are synchronous with 
the commitment periods, so that they are issued at the end of the first commitment period and 
expire five years later at the end of the next commitment period (Dutschke and Schlamadinger 
2003; Olschewski and Benitez 2005). In addition, we argue that the annual net rate of carbon 
accumulation of the shading trees in the first three land-use systems should be accounted for. 
Otherwise there is a great incentive for purely sun grown cocoa plantations, as these are more 
densely planted and hence, the total carbon accumulation per hectare is higher than in the 
more shade intensive agroforestry system. This could even foster further cutting down of the 
shading trees. The carbon fixation of the shade trees has been estimated based on a study by 
Brown et al. (1996) and included in the carbon budget for the AFS I, II and III. The tCER for 
the first five year crediting period are related to the cumulative carbon storage of the 
agroforestry system. The first credits are generated after five years. These tCER expire after 
five years, but are reissued in year 10 together with additional tCER. The same procedure is 
applied for the following 5-year periods until the last issuance of tCER in year 25, and reflects 
the total net storage of CO2 since the project started.  
The prices for tCERs represent only a fraction of the prices for regular CERs from other 
project categories such as energy projects. Forestry certificates expire after a certain time 
period, so they are only allocated non-permanent certificates. These must be replaced by 
permanent ones at some point in the future, hence, the non-permanent credits need to be 
converted to permanent CER. Therefore, the value of the temporary credits can be seen as the 
difference between the current permanent credit price and the discounted value of the future 
permanent credit price:  
 
Td
TCER
P
CERPtCERP *)( +
−=
100
                                                                  (1) 
where CER0 is the price of the CERs today and CERT the price of permanent CERs 
discounted at rate d*  found in Annex I-countries and T is the expiring time of tCER (Subak 
2003).  
For the conversion the CER prices are assumed to be constant over time (p CER 0 = p CER T), 
and a three percent discount rate (d*) is taken, which reflects the current low interest rates in 
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 Annex I countries (Deutsche Bundesbank 2007). As a tCER has a duration of five years, its 
value according to the equivalence relation in (1) is only about 14 percent of that of a 
permanent credit.  
The annual remuneration to the farmer was obtained for each land-use system through the 
calculation of the net present value, using equation (2), where d represents the discount rate in 
Indonesia and T the 5 year periods from year 5 until 25. The calculations refer to the net 
carbon accumulation. 
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For the linear programming model the net present values are converted to annuities, in order 
to show the annual payments which the farmer would receive from a 25 year sequestration 
project. The equivalent annuity method expresses the net present value as an annualised cash 
flow by dividing it by the present value of the annuity factor. The annuity factor is calculated 
according to formula (3), where i represents the interest rate and n the number of years. The 
real interest rate of 10 percent is taken, which is the rate to be found in Indonesia in 2006 
(Bank Indonesia 2006), and the time span is 25 years. Finally the annuity factor is multiplied 
by the net present value to obtain the annuity. 
11
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4. Results and Discussion 
4.1. Carbon sequestration potential 
At the plot level, the results indicate that summing up all credits, the most shade intensive 
AFS system I produces 202 tCER ha-1 in a 25 year project. This declines for the AFS systems 
II, III, resulting in 191 and 185 tCER ha-1, respectively, and for the AFS IV an issuance of 
192 tCER ha-1 occurs. The resulting payments for carbon sequestration in turn depend then on 
the expiring time of the tCER, the discount rates, the time span of the project, as well as on 
the CER prices. As mentioned above, the prices for permanent CER vary considerably on 
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carbon markets, hence different prices are considered (Table 2) to indicate the range. A price 
of € 5 tCO2e-1 is comparable to the lowest traded medium-risk CER price, whereas € 25 
tCO2e-1 at the other end represents the trading prices in the European Climate Exchange for 
2008-10 carbon allowances in May 2007 (Capoor and Ambrosi 2007). 
Table 2. Annuity payments for different prices of CER  
 Agroforestry System 
Annuity payments € ha-1 I II III IV 
d 10%, CER € 5 tCO2e-1 5.54 5.18 5.00 5.09 
d 10%, CER € 12 tCO2e-1 13.30 12.40 12.00 12.20 
d 10%, CER € 25 tCO2e-1 27.70 25.90 25.00 25.50 
d = discount rate 
With low carbon credit prices of € 5 tCO2e-1, the resulting annuity payments constitute 5 
percent of the cocoa gross margin for the high shade AFS (€ 100 ha-1), and less than 1 percent 
of the fully sun grown AFS cocoa gross margin (€ 1,460 ha-1). At carbon credit prices of € 25 
tCO2e-1, the payments amount to 28 and 2 percent of the respective cocoa gross margins. We 
can derive from the results, that the variation between the four agroforestry systems is very 
small, as the net carbon accumulation is similar between all four systems. However, the 
highest annuity payments from carbon sequestration are always obtained for the high shade 
AFS and decline towards the AFS III. The AFS IV obtains payments in the mid-range, 
because the cocoa trees are more densely planted in comparison to the other three shaded 
systems.  
In a survey conducted in 80 of the 119 villages in the research area 20,590 hectares were used 
for cocoa plantations in 2007. Approximately 1% of this area was planted with the AFS type 
I, 31% with AFS II, 60% with AFS III and 8% with AFS IV (S. Reetz, personal 
communication, 16. April 2008). Thus, if a carbon sequestration project were to be 
implemented in this region, the approximate carbon offset potential of the cocoa agroforestry 
systems would be 1,300,000 tCO2e-1, amounting to 3,855,699 tCER in 25 years. At low 
carbon prices of € 5 tCO2e-1 this would amount to an annuity payment of € 104,000, at a price 
of € 12 tCO2e-1 to € 250,000 and at € 25 tCO2e-1 to € 522,000 for a 25 year project.  
4.2. Baseline results 
Focusing on the household level, the baseline TGMs of the crop activities were calculated 
(Table 3). As explained previously, the cocoa gross margins increase in profitability when 
moving along the cocoa AFS intensification gradient from I towards IV. However, the 
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farmers in the region do not only employ the agroforestry system with the highest gross 
margin. There is a variety of complex factors and circumstances, which are not reflected in 
the model, such as the distance of the plot to the forest, traditional land use practices and 
cultural preferences, which play important roles in the households’ decisions with respect to 
their agroforestry system. The farmers who predominantly grow the AFS I might not just be 
restricted because of labour, land and credit constraints to this land use system, but also 
because their cocoa plot borders the forest and they also grow a variety of other tree crops in 
the same plot. Some farmers also believe that the shade trees prevent diseases from spreading. 
The baseline exhibits an increase of the TGM from crop activities from HHI towards HHIV. 
This result mirrors the poverty gradient, which was obtained when we categorised the 
households according to their relative welfare. Hence, it corroborates the fact that there seems 
to be a wealth gradient from household type I towards household type IV.  
Table 3. Total gross margins for the household types for different CER price scenarios  
 Household class 
Total gross margin (€ yr-1) I II III IV 
Baseline  375 1,063 1,331 2,705 
Scenario 1 
CER € 5 
389 1,076 1,344 2,715 
Scenario 2 
CER € 12 
408 1,094 1,361 2,729 
Scenario 3 
CER € 25  
443 1,128 1,312 2,756 
 
4.3. Impact of changing prices of carbon and cocoa 
The baseline model was compared with different scenarios which included the payments for 
carbon sequestration of the agroforestry systems. The impact of changing carbon credit prices 
is assessed with a constant discount rate of 10 percent in the LPM (Table 3).   
With the introduction of the payments, the HHI experiences the most pronounced relative 
impact on its TGM. The rise in total gross margin when comparing the baseline situation with 
the different payments is an increase of 4, 9 and 18 percent respectively for the price scenarios 
1,2 and 3 (see Table 3). For household types II and III, the increase is smaller (between 1 and 
6 (HHII) and 1 and 5 percent (HHIII)), whereas for household type IV the corresponding 
impact is almost negligible (between 0 and 2 percent). When looking at the absolute impact of 
the carbon payments on the TGM in Table 3, household III receives the highest additional 
payments for all three CER prices, and the amounts gradually decline for HHI, HHII and 
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HHIV. At this range of carbon prices none of the households is induced to shift its land use 
management practices.  
Shifts in land use are only observed if carbon prices for carbon sequestration of cocoa trees 
are set at higher levels. The household type III starts to take up the AFS I once the carbon 
prices reach € 55, and household type IV needs a carbon price of € 238 to induce a change in 
its land use practices, also shifting towards AFS I. Household type II only starts to realise any 
shifts in land use activity when CER prices are at € 600, switching towards AFS I and II. 
Interestingly, household type I does not realise any further shifts in land use activities, since 
its land, labour and capital constraints are binding. 
In January 2008,  the world market FOB cocoa prices were at 2,194 US$ per tonne (ICCO 
2008). In general, there is a great price volatility to be observed on the cocoa market, as prices 
respond to supply and demand factors. In the 1970s prices experienced an important increase, 
after very low prices in the 1960s which encouraged production in Indonesia and Malaysia. In 
the 1980s prices declined again and even though they modestly recovered in the mid 1990s, 
they were still low at the turn of the century and only started to increase again in the last few 
years. During the time of the survey in 2006, prices were about 1,550 US$ per tonne. The 
lowest price was observed in 2001, when prices were at 960 US$ per tonne (ICCO 2008). 
This means there has been an increase of 38 percent in world market prices of cocoa between 
2001 and 2006. Thus, in scenario 4 we look at whether, with this low cocoa price of 960 US$ 
per tonne, a carbon credit payment of € 12 tCO2e-1 would actually cause a difference and 
induce any shift in land use activity or in the TGM. Considering the impact on land use 
activity, for household types I, III and IV no shift is to be observed, and the change in TGM 
ranges from 14, 3 to 2 percent, respectively. However, HHII shifts its land use activities 
towards AFS I and II and realises an increase in its TGM of 93 percent. Summarising, for 
shifts in land use activities to occur, when all agroforestry systems receive equal payments, 
very high carbon credits would be necessary. Thus, we next assess whether shifts occur if 
explicit land use systems are targeted with payments. 
4.4. Incentives for environmentally friendly agroforestry systems 
In this section we evaluate whether carbon credits could be used as an incentive for the 
farmers if the credits are targeted only towards the two more shade intensive agroforestry 
systems, which have a higher biodiversity and are more sustainable in the long run. Hence, 
using the reduced costs derived from the LP model or opportunity costs of the different cocoa 
agroforestry activities, the minimum prices for carbon certificates can be determined, which 
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are needed for a specific activity to enter the farming plan. Therefore, in scenario 5 the 
minimum credit price at which the household types would adopt the full shade AFS I or the 
slightly less shaded AFS II to slow down the intensification trends is determined. The results 
indicate that household I needs a credit price of € 14 to adopt more (0.12 ha) of the AFS I, 
household II is stimulated to shift more (0.34 ha) towards the AFS II with credit prices of  
€ 27 and household III adopts more AFS II (0.09ha) with carbon credit prices of up to € 32 
tCO2e-1. These prices are in a range of CER to be observed on carbon markets currently and 
they are lower than the price premiums paid for organic cocoa. However, household IV would 
need very high credit prices of € 185 tCO2e-1 to induce him to adopt more of the less intensive 
cocoa production practices.  
5. Conclusions 
The present study demonstrates the importance to include smallholders, when targeting the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and searching for policy approaches. As discussed, it 
is the uncontrolled agricultural expansion at forest frontiers which undeniably contributes to 
its conversion and loss. Market-based mechanisms and incentive schemes, such as carbon 
credits, can offer solutions for the sustainable management and conservation of forests. 
In fact, in this specific context of the Lore Lindu National Park in Central Sulawesi in 
Indonesia, the intensification process among the cocoa production systems leads to a gradual 
removal of original forest shade trees towards fully sun grown monocultures. This trend is not 
sustainable in the long run, as the soil productivity declines and species-richness is reduced.  
From this study we can derive that per hectare payments for carbon sequestration of cocoa 
agroforestry systems are the highest for fully shaded land use systems, but in general hardly 
differ between the systems. Depending on the certificate prices, a farmer could obtain 
between € 6 and € 28 per hectare for the carbon sequestration of the cocoa agroforestry 
system. With low certificate prices of € 5 tCO2e-1, the additional remuneration for the cocoa 
in general is quite low, especially in comparison to the very high gross margin of € 1,460 per 
hectare of the intensively managed cocoa. However, with carbon certificate prices at the upper 
end, the households who obtain the lowest total gross margin from their crop activities can 
realise an 18 percent increase of their gross margin from cropping activities with the 
introduction of payments. These households also realise the second highest increase in 
absolute terms of their gross margin. Additionally, they provide the second highest (and only 
marginally lower than the highest) environmental benefit in terms of the annual carbon 
sequestration rate of their cocoa agroforestry systems. Therefore, the importance of the carbon 
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payments is not so much the absolute impact itself, but more importantly which household 
type derives more benefit. If the payments were specifically targeted towards the high-shade 
agroforestry systems, indirectly the poorer households from the local ethnic group would 
benefit. In turn, this additional income could reduce their need to sell their land to the 
migrants and open up further forest land at the margin or sometimes even inside of the Lore 
Lindu National Park.  
On a regional scale for the research area there is a carbon offset potential of 1,300,000 tCO2e 
from all cocoa plantations which in comparison to the BioCarbon Fund Projects of the World 
Bank would be in the upper range of their projects. This could lead to annual payments 
between € 100,000 to € 500,000 from the carbon sequestration of the agroforestry systems. 
However, the limits for a small scale afforestation project under the CDM, which only allows 
for an annual average greenhouse gas removal by sinks of less than 16.000 tCO2e, would be 
exceeded. Such a small-scale project could be an option for the AFS type I farmers, as the 
smallest area share among the cocoa plantations is planted with the full shade cocoa (264 
hectares), and they would only need to gather a total area of their shade intensive cocoa 
agroforestry systems of 240 hectares. 
Carbon certificates could also be used as a price premium to reward households to carry out 
less intensively managed land use practices. Results show that they can offer the possibility to 
provide an incentive for the majority of households to adopt more of the shade intensive AFS 
I and II. The analysis indicates that the farmers of the household types I-III would need 
differentiated prices to stimulate the switch towards the more sustainable land use systems, 
but that current prices which are observed on the carbon markets could doubtlessly be 
sufficient. However, the economically better off households need extremely high credit prices 
to change their land use practices from the highly intensive managed agroforestry systems 
towards the shade intensive agroforestry systems. The inherent problem lays in the fact that 
the fully sun grown cocoa receives very high net-revenues, which makes it very difficult to 
provide viable and financially attractive alternative activities for these farmers. However, in 
the long run these systems will not be sustainable and experience a decline in yields due to 
anticipated agronomic risks such as declining soil fertility. 
If carbon payments are applied in general to all agroforestry systems there will be an impact 
on the households’ income, but no change with respect to a switch in land use systems. 
However, if other criteria, such as the provision of further environmental services are 
included, specific systems can be targeted in order to promote a switch towards these 
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agroforestry systems. To conclude, one can say that for the carbon payments to be efficient 
and promote a shift towards land uses which provide higher biodiversity values and 
ecosystem functioning, payments targeted towards medium to high shade intensive land use 
systems would be needed. This could ensure that the changes are made into the desired 
direction. Additionally, we have observed that the poorest households seem to benefit 
relatively more than the better off from carbon payments. It seems as if win-win situations are 
possible, where with carbon payments environmentally more sustainable land uses systems 
are promoted and poverty can be reduced.  
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